By Richard J. Aldrich
The chilly struggle is frequently thought of to be the vital intelligence clash. but mystery intelligence continues to be the `missing measurement' of Britain's chilly battle historical past. This quantity deals an authoritative photo of Britain's clandestine position within the improvement of the chilly struggle focusing upon the most important problems with intelligence and process.
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Extra resources for British Intelligence, Strategy and the Cold War, 1945-51
In 1948 pressure from the COS and from permanent officials in the Foreign Office prompted discussions on the need for a ‘permanent Cold War planning staff’ to manage this clandestine effort. Subsequent moves to establish a central planning apparatus, albeit reluctant and dogged by acrimony, constituted a critical turningpoint in the higher direction of the British intelligence community. 17 Responding to this JIC paper, Frank Roberts, a relatively junior but influential diplomat in Moscow (like his American counterpart George Kennan), suggested that the Soviet Union was pursuing a global policy, not least because of ‘the ubiquitous activities of the communist parties directed, if not controlled in detail from Moscow’.
80 However, contrary to some accounts, the specific appointment of Percy Sillitoe, Chief Constable of Kent, was not a political decision by Attlee, but instead the result of general consensus among senior officials. When interviewed, Sillitoe simply outperformed the other candidates. m. to interview Penney and Strong. ] meeting in Bridges’ room [the Cabinet Secretary’s office] to interview candidates for succession to MI5. We were unanimous in choosing Sillitoe, Chief Constable. 81 Guy Liddell, MI5’s rising star, was appointed as Sillitoe’s deputy.
But in two senses the military faced impediments in their efforts to stiffen Britain’s conduct of the Cold War. First, their initiative, albeit watered down by Alexander, was clearly an attack upon Bevin and was unlikely to receive a sympathetic hearing. Second, while many permanent officials in the Foreign Office accepted the military prescription for an offensive ‘using every agency’, Bevin did not. 34 The COS met with initial success in the autumn of 1948 since senior Foreign Office officials were agreed on the danger of ‘losing the Cold War’ and that their response should be accelerated.